Montenegro is entering a critical phase in its bid for European Union membership, with EU officials indicating that the country is now in the “endgame” of its accession process. This development comes as Brussels initiates preparations for Montenegro’s accession treaty, positioning it as the most advanced candidate for EU membership among Western Balkan nations. Since the commencement of negotiations in 2012, this marks a significant momentum shift for Montenegro.
The political implications of this progress are considerable. For the first time in years, the EU is not merely discussing Montenegro’s long-term candidacy but is actively working on institutional mechanisms for actual membership. In April, EU ambassadors approved the formation of an ad hoc working group to draft the accession treaty, signaling that Montenegrin membership is now viewed as a realistic medium-term goal.
Prime Minister Milojko Spajić’s administration has set an ambitious target to close all negotiating chapters by the end of 2026 and achieve full EU membership by 2028. Currently, Montenegro has provisionally closed 14 out of 33 negotiating chapters, making it the leading candidate among Western Balkan states. Notably, it has met essential interim benchmarks for Chapters 23 and 24, which focus on judiciary, rule of law, and security—considered crucial for completing the final phase of negotiations.
The tone within European institutions has shifted significantly. European Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos recently remarked that Montenegro is “in the endgame,” while also cautioning that challenging reforms remain ahead. The European Commission noted that Montenegro and the EU are “closer than ever” after over fourteen years of negotiations.
This political shift is underpinned by broader geopolitical considerations. The invasion of Ukraine by Russia has prompted the EU to reassess its enlargement strategy, viewing Western Balkan integration as a strategic security imperative to mitigate geopolitical instability and counter Russian and Chinese influence in Southeast Europe.
Montenegro aligns well with this strategy; unlike Serbia, it has fully supported EU sanctions against Russia and maintains a pro-Western foreign policy. As such, Brussels increasingly sees Montenegro as a politically viable candidate capable of demonstrating that EU enlargement can still yield tangible results.
Spajić has framed EU membership not just as a financial opportunity but as a strategic project focused on stability and market access. This perspective highlights how Montenegro views accession primarily through the lens of geopolitical positioning rather than solely infrastructure funding.
The potential economic impacts of EU membership could be transformative for Montenegro. Integration into the largest single market globally could lower sovereign borrowing costs, enhance investor confidence, and accelerate capital inflows across various sectors including tourism, infrastructure, renewable energy, and logistics.
This prospect is already influencing investment dynamics within Montenegro’s economy. Developments in luxury tourism, coastal real estate, marina projects, renewable energy initiatives, and infrastructure financing are increasingly predicated on the assumption that Montenegro will transition from a peripheral Adriatic market to an integrated EU member state.
The banking sector and foreign direct investment flows are particularly sensitive to this perception. EU accession could bolster institutional credibility, enhance regulatory predictability, and deepen access to European financing mechanisms—factors that could significantly alter long-term growth trajectories for this small economy heavily reliant on tourism and foreign capital.
However, the final phase of accession may prove to be the most challenging. While technical progress has accelerated over the past two years, remaining chapters involve politically sensitive reforms related to judicial independence, anti-corruption measures, institutional appointments, public administration reform, and media freedom.
European institutions have emphasized that successful implementation—not just legislative adoption—will determine whether Montenegro can reach its accession goals. This emphasis reflects changes in EU enlargement philosophy following previous experiences with democratic backsliding among member states. Commissioner Kos indicated that future accession treaties may incorporate “stronger safeguards” against deterioration in rule-of-law standards post-membership.
Consequently, Montenegro faces a more demanding accession environment compared to earlier enlargement waves. Domestic political fragmentation poses additional risks; the coalition landscape remains unstable with competing pro-European factions and nationalist forces amid tensions rooted in the country’s post-Yugoslav history. Fitch Solutions recently cautioned that the target date of 2028 may be “overly ambitious” due to ongoing challenges in judicial reform and anti-corruption efforts.
The broader European context also plays a crucial role in Montenegro’s accession prospects. Despite renewed momentum for enlargement since 2022, EU member states remain cautious about accepting new members amid rising internal political fragmentation and geopolitical uncertainties. While support exists for enlargement, it is increasingly conditional and driven by security concerns rather than idealistic motivations.
Nevertheless, Montenegro’s trajectory appears more advanced than any previous Western Balkan candidate since Croatia joined the EU in 2013. Brussels is effectively testing whether its enlargement process can still yield credible success stories.
The next eighteen months will be pivotal not only for Montenegro’s European future but also for assessing the credibility of the EU’s strategy towards the Western Balkans.
